REVIEW: Chang’s “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country”
REVIEW: Chang’s “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country”
By Kevin A. Stoda, Matsu Islands, Taiwan
Chang, Wen-Chun (2010) “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country,” Poverty & Public Policy: Vol 2: Iss 4, Article 5, http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol2/iss4/art5/
I came across this article (cited fully above) published in the Poverty & Public Policy journal at the end of the last year. This particular article focuses on the role that religious background and interests play in the realm of demanding redistribution of resources and moneys in an East Asian country. The country of interest to the researchers is naturally Taiwan--where I currently live and work. This research article, is partially reviewed here. The article is written by Wen-Chun Chang and involves statistical analyses that will need to be reviewed and authenticated over the next decades to substantially increase its helpfulness and explanatory value.
The article (2010) is originally from Taiwan National University sources and is now entitled in English as follows: “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country.”
The author, Chang, claims that his review of national surveys of conducted over recent decades with Taiwanese have implications for all of East Asia, especially, in terms of how East Asian nations make decisions about redistribution- and welfare policies—even in our globalizing age where so much has focused in recent decades on the role of individual initiative and the international demand to level international economic playing fields. (Chang doesn’t mention it but Taiwan is a major exporter of Chinese culture regionally and globally. More importantly, Taiwanese popular culture has been so strong for so long that it will continue to have important backwash effects on East Asian and Chinese communities for decades to come.)
I would add that as East Asians make up an enormous percentage of the global population (nearly 2 billion peoples) , that Chang’s summary of implications ( if replicable over a decade or more) for Taiwan should be seen as pertinent and important to comprehending international, social, and political-economic development trends in coming decades for the whole planet, i.e. because what East Asians do effects the entire planet in terms of consumerism, consumption of raw materials, and capitalism.
KEY FINDINGS (based on 2006 data)
According to Chang, “[i]n particular, under the social and cultural context of an East Asian country, the linkages between religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance and preferences for redistributive policies are different from what have been found in studies of Western Christian societies.” For example, “[b]eing Protestant leads to a more favorable attitude toward several social insurance and welfare programs in Taiwan.” Meanwhile, “Buddhists and Taoists tend to be more supportive of a government’s role in providing health care” with “believers of folk religions . . . more favorable for the provision of financial help to students from low-income families.”
In short, East Asia appears to be behaving differently than the West—with its longer traditional concepts of separation between church and state. For example, traditional social scientific belief in the West has postulated that the more humanistic any particular regime behaves towards its citizens (and citizenry) as a whole, the more willing the citizenry are to find solace, health, wealth, and security outside of any religious sphere, especially in the state or the corporate state identity. (However, labor unions and political organizations have offered such solace and security, too.)
This secularization process came to be expected (over-time) in Europe and North America to be forever-busy-creating pronounced differences in how religious individuals voted or coalesced in groupings, i.e. in terms of support for particular political agendas.
For this reason, it had been observed for centuries in Western Europe that various catholic and protestant parties would be founded around particular issues—often-times separated from the so-called non-religious or anti-religious parties interests and campaigns.
This splintering continued in Europe over many generations--with historically different positions developing between the protestant, catholic and the non-religious groupings across the political party spectrum of the continent. However, the overall effect of the supposed growing state-church schism was that if religion continued to play any major role in societal developments, this was suspected to be only a reflection of overlap with the rest of secularized society’s demands and needs--and not the other way around.
However, East Asia, which from a western popular culture perspective appears less- and less spiritual and religious, might be observed to be behaving to some degree quite differently when it comes to social, economic, and political matters than the West. This may be because the fundamentals of society may still be recognized by almost all East Asian actors as still functioning in their historical roles. According to what Chang reveals to us readers, this is even still currently reflected in the religious influences on modern East Asian thinking on governance, economy, and the politics of wealth-redistribution.
THE EAST ASIAN EXCEPTION?
Naturally, in recent decades, the supposedly inevitable trend towards secularization in the West has been called into question by the growing facts on the ground, i.e. that religion is just not going away.
Moreover, religion is a unifying and strong political force—both ethnically and culturally—even in North America and Europe. (Two examples of highly secularized cultures.) A variety of the political forces of this last century have shown that religions often provide the fundamental precepts by which a society functions.
Moreover, religions indoctrinate and re-enforce noteworthy facets of culture, its ideals, and society. In some cases, religion is like the cement tying belief systems together—creating a mass identity (for example, West vs. East , Christian versus non-Christian, Muslim versus non-Muslim) while at the same time religions can lead to revolt, i.e. as when the state itself is called into question, as occurred with the Iranian revolution in 1979. [Similarly, the churches played roles in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the following decade.]
Unlike South Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia—where religious patronage and political party patronage have been observed to have played major roles in the political landscape continuously for centuries--, the so-called (quickly) secularization (westernization) of Japan, the Koreas, China and Taiwan over the past hundred-fifty years (or so) have left most all the religious parties on the sidelines of the local and national landscapes. For example, in Japan seldom have religious-based parties ever gained more than 5% of the votes in national elections in recent decades. Similarly, in Taiwan only two big-tent parties have dominated in the land—similar to in the USA. More obvious-still is the weakness of religion’s role officially in mainland China, where only the communist party has been allowed to publicly operate for 7 decades.
On the other hand, Confucianist governance and Confucianist economic-politics have been touted to and referred to for decades, i.e. when dealing with East and Southeast Asian economic development. Chang notes in this article, “[c]ompared to Western Christian societies, many East Asian countries have inherited the traditional cultures of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism that strongly emphasize collective well-being rather than individual success.” [1] Most importantly, Chang continues, “[p]eople’s perceptions about the principles of justice usually relate to their beliefs derived from the value systems under a specific socio-economic condition of society.”
At this point, I need to remind readers that Asian (and world or ancient history) scholars claim that the collectivist identities present here in the Far East are in many ways the direct result of the rise of rice-farming system (and related technological and governing structures) in Asia over 5 to 12 millennia ago, i.e. due to natural geographic conditions. Geographically and historically, these understandings imply that, as a whole, East Asia is mountainous and water is plentiful. A means to harvest water in inhospitable environs required teamwork—often on a massive scale. Harnessing and distributing these natural resources in unfriendly terrain and weather required a collectivist spirit.
In short, rice-farming involves a lot of collective usage of ( i.e. sharing) of water, drainage, and human resources. Conducting rice-farming on any massive scale required that a fair and less-than-arbitrary distribution of natural resources and labor be under the control of authorities supported by the farming communities, and farming families. Otherwise, life would be nasty, short, and brutish for all. Therefore, governance that governed best was one that functioned in community-centered fashion and simultaneously had to govern least, i.e. providing a cost-efficient safety and support for the commonweal through collective distribution and redistribution of resources as time and needs changed. In short, often only an efficient system that did not waste the natural and human resources could prosper well for any lengthy period of time.
It was into in such an agrarian kingdom that governance and resource distribution issues were discussed widely 4 millennia ago. These discussions and collapsesof civilizations in China itself had led seekers and administrators, like Confucian and his adherents, to search for the best way to organize society.
In China’s case, i.e. in the geographic location where Confucian found himself, there had already been several overbearing emperors, i.e. ones who had misused and stretched human and natural resources to the breaking point. This cycle of change over the prior decades and centuries had apparently caused --and fueled--other man-made systematic imbalances (further revolts) and led to natural imbalances (leading to agricultural erosion, poverty and stagnation) . In other words, things had fallen apart so extremely that several major Chinese kingdoms had already disappeared.
The search for a long-lasting government and a right-living system was of continuous ongoing interests for the Chinese--as these same matters were for kingdoms much further to the West. Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, other faiths and still-other world views were means for pursuing both the goals of better societal organization (i.e. community) and to pursue individual self-interest in the name of seeking harmony with nature and society. Later, codification of practices as these faiths 9and world views) merged and synchronized with one another. These interrelationships deepened over time--creating common values across clans and regions as the centuries rolled on.
VALUE SYSTEMS IN MODERN TAIWAN
Chang suggests “that religion’s role in shaping people’s attitudes toward redistributive policies in Taiwan is substantially different from what is found in studies using data from advanced Western societies.” For example, his findings demonstrate that in the case of all three major areas of social redistribution in society discussed in his paper, Protestantism “leads [in Taiwan] to a more favorable attitude” towards these government projects, [even] “while Buddhists and Taoists tend to be more supportive of a government’s role in [specifically] providing healthcare.”[3] In addition, believers of folk religions are [still] more favorable toward the provision of financial help for students from low-income families. [4]
Chang’s main thesis here is that “an important part of traditional cultures, religion is influential in the cultivation and indoctrination of people’s beliefs about fairness, social justice, and the legitimization of redistributive policies.” His research shows that in the case of Taiwan,” people’s preferences for governments role in redistribution” can be explained by their individual identification with religions and faiths of East Asia—as well as modern imports, such as Christianity. [5]
WHY IS THE INFLUENCE OF PROTESTANTS HERE DIFFERENT?
I have a different spin on why even Protestants continue to support the state’s involvement in redistribution in Taiwan today. There are several possible reasons. (1) Protestant faiths—as newcomers to the island—have reached out to the more marginalized peoples in society as their base. They are thus more in tune with what the needs and short-comings of society are. The democratization process of Taiwan over the past 3 or more decades has led to criticism of the state while at the same time giving citizens more voice. Part of the trend in Taiwan (in contrast to Mainland China historically) in recent years has been to promote a pluralistic view of self—as contrasted with some monolithic notion of what it means to be Chinese.[6]
(2) Protestants are more in synch with other basic needs of faith and life here in Taiwan than they have in other places where they have been observed as latent occupiers. . This means that Protestantism—which in many cases is true in ecumenical circles in the West today—can absorb the idea of synchronizing faiths, worldviews, etc. this is not unlike what the Catholics did when they arrived in the Americas’ and the Philippines—but bringing love instead of swords.
In Taiwan, many young people are lost as times and life changes fast. However, here it is still seen as important for the individual and society that individuals be encouraged to find a family and tribe or faith. (There has even been growth in the non-Christian sectors in recent decades in Taiwan, too.) It is like what my mother said to me when I grew up and left home. Go to church on Sunday—any church. This means that seeking is encouraged much more than in the past to find his or her own way. Naturally, this has led officially--and in even more respects unofficially--to greater sense of tolerance and celebration of diverse backgrounds in society here in Taiwan—as long as the basic virtues of fairness and good-governance for all is maintained.
Finally, Chang warns correctly that the growing rift between the super-wealthy Taiwanese in a modern or western laisse-faire capitalist manner is leaving a bad taste in the mouths of many in Taiwan who would like to see greater harmony. Poverty in Taiwan is a reality and a shame—just as it is anywhere else on earth.
On the other hand, while “the stuff” underlying East Asian desire to have fairness and justice in terms of development (while promoting societal stability) is of spiritual nature, it seems inevitable that these same forces will continue to support an appropriate role for the state in redistributing resources and providing for the Commonweal—despite what Western and U.S.A trends have shown historically. Protestants have done well in East Asia recently by synchronizing themselves with the neglected members and clients of society, enabling them to stand and support tribal and minority interests. They, however, by synchronizing—rather than transforming—are following the same missionary path of dozens of other faiths and belief systems in East Asia before them.
The bottom line is to avoid war, civil wars, and unrest. Wise and fair legislation and redistributions are required. No one wants to live on a volcano. Demand what is fair for all and ask that the pie be large for all—especially those that are disadvantaged or in cyclical duress.
NOTES
[1] Chang, Wen-Chun (2010) “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies
in an East Asian Country,” Poverty & Public Policy: Vol 2: Iss 4, Article 5, p. 84.
[2] Rice-growing practices certainly enabled the Nile cultures in Africa to thrive millennia ago—even in relatively desert-like conditions as compared to what East and South Asians face in terms of seasonal monsoons. However, one similarity between Eastern and Western Civilization developments early on were the results of the successes of good policies and practices in grain production. The ability to produce more food than what was needed historically led to the rise of artisan and priestly clans--and great societies--who have left us vast anthropological treasures well-into this 21st Century a.d.
[3] Chang, (2010), p. 85.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., pp. 85-86. Interestingly there is a negative trend to be found amongst those attending religious services or institutions one or more times each week. That is, some of those who attend to their faith in community and public more often seem to be less interested in changing status quo or redistributing more than those whose attendance is less often. Perhaps this is reminiscent of trends in the West, whereby once one has begun to regularly eliminate one’s social insecurities through religion, one begins to suggest to others that simply depending on government for all of one’s solutions may not be the answer either. On the other hand, perhaps it is simply an example of the rise of the protestant work ethic in Asia, as neo-liberal world outlooks (in terms of one’s ability to lift oneself up by one’s bootstraps) come to dominate the region in this third millennia.
[6] The culture of Taiwan is a hybrid blend of Confucianist Han Chinese, Japanese, European, American, global, local and Taiwanese aborigines cultures, which are often perceived in both traditional and modern understandings.[1] The common socio-political experience in Taiwan gradually developed into a sense of Taiwanese cultural identity and a feeling of Taiwanese cultural awareness, which has been widely debated domestically.[2] Reflecting the continuing controversy surrounding the political status of Taiwan, politics continues to play a role in the conception and development of a Taiwanese cultural identity, especially in the prior dominant frame of a Taiwanese and Chinese dualism. In recent years, the concept of Taiwanese multiculturalism has been proposed as a relatively apolitical alternative view, which has allowed for the inclusion of mainlanders and other minority groups into the continuing re-definition of Taiwanese culture as collectively held systems of meaning and customary patterns of thought and behavior shared by the people of Taiwan.[3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Taiwan
By Kevin A. Stoda, Matsu Islands, Taiwan
Chang, Wen-Chun (2010) “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country,” Poverty & Public Policy: Vol 2: Iss 4, Article 5, http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol2/iss4/art5/
I came across this article (cited fully above) published in the Poverty & Public Policy journal at the end of the last year. This particular article focuses on the role that religious background and interests play in the realm of demanding redistribution of resources and moneys in an East Asian country. The country of interest to the researchers is naturally Taiwan--where I currently live and work. This research article, is partially reviewed here. The article is written by Wen-Chun Chang and involves statistical analyses that will need to be reviewed and authenticated over the next decades to substantially increase its helpfulness and explanatory value.
The article (2010) is originally from Taiwan National University sources and is now entitled in English as follows: “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies in an East Asian Country.”
The author, Chang, claims that his review of national surveys of conducted over recent decades with Taiwanese have implications for all of East Asia, especially, in terms of how East Asian nations make decisions about redistribution- and welfare policies—even in our globalizing age where so much has focused in recent decades on the role of individual initiative and the international demand to level international economic playing fields. (Chang doesn’t mention it but Taiwan is a major exporter of Chinese culture regionally and globally. More importantly, Taiwanese popular culture has been so strong for so long that it will continue to have important backwash effects on East Asian and Chinese communities for decades to come.)
I would add that as East Asians make up an enormous percentage of the global population (nearly 2 billion peoples) , that Chang’s summary of implications ( if replicable over a decade or more) for Taiwan should be seen as pertinent and important to comprehending international, social, and political-economic development trends in coming decades for the whole planet, i.e. because what East Asians do effects the entire planet in terms of consumerism, consumption of raw materials, and capitalism.
KEY FINDINGS (based on 2006 data)
According to Chang, “[i]n particular, under the social and cultural context of an East Asian country, the linkages between religious affiliation and frequency of religious attendance and preferences for redistributive policies are different from what have been found in studies of Western Christian societies.” For example, “[b]eing Protestant leads to a more favorable attitude toward several social insurance and welfare programs in Taiwan.” Meanwhile, “Buddhists and Taoists tend to be more supportive of a government’s role in providing health care” with “believers of folk religions . . . more favorable for the provision of financial help to students from low-income families.”
In short, East Asia appears to be behaving differently than the West—with its longer traditional concepts of separation between church and state. For example, traditional social scientific belief in the West has postulated that the more humanistic any particular regime behaves towards its citizens (and citizenry) as a whole, the more willing the citizenry are to find solace, health, wealth, and security outside of any religious sphere, especially in the state or the corporate state identity. (However, labor unions and political organizations have offered such solace and security, too.)
This secularization process came to be expected (over-time) in Europe and North America to be forever-busy-creating pronounced differences in how religious individuals voted or coalesced in groupings, i.e. in terms of support for particular political agendas.
For this reason, it had been observed for centuries in Western Europe that various catholic and protestant parties would be founded around particular issues—often-times separated from the so-called non-religious or anti-religious parties interests and campaigns.
This splintering continued in Europe over many generations--with historically different positions developing between the protestant, catholic and the non-religious groupings across the political party spectrum of the continent. However, the overall effect of the supposed growing state-church schism was that if religion continued to play any major role in societal developments, this was suspected to be only a reflection of overlap with the rest of secularized society’s demands and needs--and not the other way around.
However, East Asia, which from a western popular culture perspective appears less- and less spiritual and religious, might be observed to be behaving to some degree quite differently when it comes to social, economic, and political matters than the West. This may be because the fundamentals of society may still be recognized by almost all East Asian actors as still functioning in their historical roles. According to what Chang reveals to us readers, this is even still currently reflected in the religious influences on modern East Asian thinking on governance, economy, and the politics of wealth-redistribution.
THE EAST ASIAN EXCEPTION?
Naturally, in recent decades, the supposedly inevitable trend towards secularization in the West has been called into question by the growing facts on the ground, i.e. that religion is just not going away.
Moreover, religion is a unifying and strong political force—both ethnically and culturally—even in North America and Europe. (Two examples of highly secularized cultures.) A variety of the political forces of this last century have shown that religions often provide the fundamental precepts by which a society functions.
Moreover, religions indoctrinate and re-enforce noteworthy facets of culture, its ideals, and society. In some cases, religion is like the cement tying belief systems together—creating a mass identity (for example, West vs. East , Christian versus non-Christian, Muslim versus non-Muslim) while at the same time religions can lead to revolt, i.e. as when the state itself is called into question, as occurred with the Iranian revolution in 1979. [Similarly, the churches played roles in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the following decade.]
Unlike South Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia—where religious patronage and political party patronage have been observed to have played major roles in the political landscape continuously for centuries--, the so-called (quickly) secularization (westernization) of Japan, the Koreas, China and Taiwan over the past hundred-fifty years (or so) have left most all the religious parties on the sidelines of the local and national landscapes. For example, in Japan seldom have religious-based parties ever gained more than 5% of the votes in national elections in recent decades. Similarly, in Taiwan only two big-tent parties have dominated in the land—similar to in the USA. More obvious-still is the weakness of religion’s role officially in mainland China, where only the communist party has been allowed to publicly operate for 7 decades.
On the other hand, Confucianist governance and Confucianist economic-politics have been touted to and referred to for decades, i.e. when dealing with East and Southeast Asian economic development. Chang notes in this article, “[c]ompared to Western Christian societies, many East Asian countries have inherited the traditional cultures of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism that strongly emphasize collective well-being rather than individual success.” [1] Most importantly, Chang continues, “[p]eople’s perceptions about the principles of justice usually relate to their beliefs derived from the value systems under a specific socio-economic condition of society.”
At this point, I need to remind readers that Asian (and world or ancient history) scholars claim that the collectivist identities present here in the Far East are in many ways the direct result of the rise of rice-farming system (and related technological and governing structures) in Asia over 5 to 12 millennia ago, i.e. due to natural geographic conditions. Geographically and historically, these understandings imply that, as a whole, East Asia is mountainous and water is plentiful. A means to harvest water in inhospitable environs required teamwork—often on a massive scale. Harnessing and distributing these natural resources in unfriendly terrain and weather required a collectivist spirit.
In short, rice-farming involves a lot of collective usage of ( i.e. sharing) of water, drainage, and human resources. Conducting rice-farming on any massive scale required that a fair and less-than-arbitrary distribution of natural resources and labor be under the control of authorities supported by the farming communities, and farming families. Otherwise, life would be nasty, short, and brutish for all. Therefore, governance that governed best was one that functioned in community-centered fashion and simultaneously had to govern least, i.e. providing a cost-efficient safety and support for the commonweal through collective distribution and redistribution of resources as time and needs changed. In short, often only an efficient system that did not waste the natural and human resources could prosper well for any lengthy period of time.
It was into in such an agrarian kingdom that governance and resource distribution issues were discussed widely 4 millennia ago. These discussions and collapsesof civilizations in China itself had led seekers and administrators, like Confucian and his adherents, to search for the best way to organize society.
In China’s case, i.e. in the geographic location where Confucian found himself, there had already been several overbearing emperors, i.e. ones who had misused and stretched human and natural resources to the breaking point. This cycle of change over the prior decades and centuries had apparently caused --and fueled--other man-made systematic imbalances (further revolts) and led to natural imbalances (leading to agricultural erosion, poverty and stagnation) . In other words, things had fallen apart so extremely that several major Chinese kingdoms had already disappeared.
The search for a long-lasting government and a right-living system was of continuous ongoing interests for the Chinese--as these same matters were for kingdoms much further to the West. Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, other faiths and still-other world views were means for pursuing both the goals of better societal organization (i.e. community) and to pursue individual self-interest in the name of seeking harmony with nature and society. Later, codification of practices as these faiths 9and world views) merged and synchronized with one another. These interrelationships deepened over time--creating common values across clans and regions as the centuries rolled on.
VALUE SYSTEMS IN MODERN TAIWAN
Chang suggests “that religion’s role in shaping people’s attitudes toward redistributive policies in Taiwan is substantially different from what is found in studies using data from advanced Western societies.” For example, his findings demonstrate that in the case of all three major areas of social redistribution in society discussed in his paper, Protestantism “leads [in Taiwan] to a more favorable attitude” towards these government projects, [even] “while Buddhists and Taoists tend to be more supportive of a government’s role in [specifically] providing healthcare.”[3] In addition, believers of folk religions are [still] more favorable toward the provision of financial help for students from low-income families. [4]
Chang’s main thesis here is that “an important part of traditional cultures, religion is influential in the cultivation and indoctrination of people’s beliefs about fairness, social justice, and the legitimization of redistributive policies.” His research shows that in the case of Taiwan,” people’s preferences for governments role in redistribution” can be explained by their individual identification with religions and faiths of East Asia—as well as modern imports, such as Christianity. [5]
WHY IS THE INFLUENCE OF PROTESTANTS HERE DIFFERENT?
I have a different spin on why even Protestants continue to support the state’s involvement in redistribution in Taiwan today. There are several possible reasons. (1) Protestant faiths—as newcomers to the island—have reached out to the more marginalized peoples in society as their base. They are thus more in tune with what the needs and short-comings of society are. The democratization process of Taiwan over the past 3 or more decades has led to criticism of the state while at the same time giving citizens more voice. Part of the trend in Taiwan (in contrast to Mainland China historically) in recent years has been to promote a pluralistic view of self—as contrasted with some monolithic notion of what it means to be Chinese.[6]
(2) Protestants are more in synch with other basic needs of faith and life here in Taiwan than they have in other places where they have been observed as latent occupiers. . This means that Protestantism—which in many cases is true in ecumenical circles in the West today—can absorb the idea of synchronizing faiths, worldviews, etc. this is not unlike what the Catholics did when they arrived in the Americas’ and the Philippines—but bringing love instead of swords.
In Taiwan, many young people are lost as times and life changes fast. However, here it is still seen as important for the individual and society that individuals be encouraged to find a family and tribe or faith. (There has even been growth in the non-Christian sectors in recent decades in Taiwan, too.) It is like what my mother said to me when I grew up and left home. Go to church on Sunday—any church. This means that seeking is encouraged much more than in the past to find his or her own way. Naturally, this has led officially--and in even more respects unofficially--to greater sense of tolerance and celebration of diverse backgrounds in society here in Taiwan—as long as the basic virtues of fairness and good-governance for all is maintained.
Finally, Chang warns correctly that the growing rift between the super-wealthy Taiwanese in a modern or western laisse-faire capitalist manner is leaving a bad taste in the mouths of many in Taiwan who would like to see greater harmony. Poverty in Taiwan is a reality and a shame—just as it is anywhere else on earth.
On the other hand, while “the stuff” underlying East Asian desire to have fairness and justice in terms of development (while promoting societal stability) is of spiritual nature, it seems inevitable that these same forces will continue to support an appropriate role for the state in redistributing resources and providing for the Commonweal—despite what Western and U.S.A trends have shown historically. Protestants have done well in East Asia recently by synchronizing themselves with the neglected members and clients of society, enabling them to stand and support tribal and minority interests. They, however, by synchronizing—rather than transforming—are following the same missionary path of dozens of other faiths and belief systems in East Asia before them.
The bottom line is to avoid war, civil wars, and unrest. Wise and fair legislation and redistributions are required. No one wants to live on a volcano. Demand what is fair for all and ask that the pie be large for all—especially those that are disadvantaged or in cyclical duress.
NOTES
[1] Chang, Wen-Chun (2010) “Religion and Preferences for Redistributive Policies
in an East Asian Country,” Poverty & Public Policy: Vol 2: Iss 4, Article 5, p. 84.
[2] Rice-growing practices certainly enabled the Nile cultures in Africa to thrive millennia ago—even in relatively desert-like conditions as compared to what East and South Asians face in terms of seasonal monsoons. However, one similarity between Eastern and Western Civilization developments early on were the results of the successes of good policies and practices in grain production. The ability to produce more food than what was needed historically led to the rise of artisan and priestly clans--and great societies--who have left us vast anthropological treasures well-into this 21st Century a.d.
[3] Chang, (2010), p. 85.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., pp. 85-86. Interestingly there is a negative trend to be found amongst those attending religious services or institutions one or more times each week. That is, some of those who attend to their faith in community and public more often seem to be less interested in changing status quo or redistributing more than those whose attendance is less often. Perhaps this is reminiscent of trends in the West, whereby once one has begun to regularly eliminate one’s social insecurities through religion, one begins to suggest to others that simply depending on government for all of one’s solutions may not be the answer either. On the other hand, perhaps it is simply an example of the rise of the protestant work ethic in Asia, as neo-liberal world outlooks (in terms of one’s ability to lift oneself up by one’s bootstraps) come to dominate the region in this third millennia.
[6] The culture of Taiwan is a hybrid blend of Confucianist Han Chinese, Japanese, European, American, global, local and Taiwanese aborigines cultures, which are often perceived in both traditional and modern understandings.[1] The common socio-political experience in Taiwan gradually developed into a sense of Taiwanese cultural identity and a feeling of Taiwanese cultural awareness, which has been widely debated domestically.[2] Reflecting the continuing controversy surrounding the political status of Taiwan, politics continues to play a role in the conception and development of a Taiwanese cultural identity, especially in the prior dominant frame of a Taiwanese and Chinese dualism. In recent years, the concept of Taiwanese multiculturalism has been proposed as a relatively apolitical alternative view, which has allowed for the inclusion of mainlanders and other minority groups into the continuing re-definition of Taiwanese culture as collectively held systems of meaning and customary patterns of thought and behavior shared by the people of Taiwan.[3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Taiwan
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